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IN THE 
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OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
D. W. DORRITY and FERN W. DOR-
RITY, his wife; BANK OF IRON 
COUNTY, 
Defendants-R espondents. 
Case No. 
13683 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a condemnation action by the Utah State 
Road Commission to acquire certain real property in Iron 
County for the purpose of constructing a portion of the 
1-15 Freeway. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After the trial of this matter the State Road Com-
mission made a motion for a new trial which was denied 
by the District Court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Utah State Road Commission, Plaintiff-Appel-
lant in the action seeks a reversal of the court's denial 
of a new trial together with an order that the case be 
remanded for new trial. 
FACTS 
The plaintiff in this case acquired from the defen-
dants a parcel of land needed for the construction of a 
portion of the freeway system in Iron County, The land 
acquired consisted of 6.68 acres (Pltf. Ex. 1). The de-
fendants' property, prior to the taking consisted of 19.29 
acres (Pltf. Ex. 1). The defendants' remaining property 
after the taking consisted of two parcels, one north of 
the taking consisting of 1.18 acres and 11.43 acres south 
of the take (Tr. 39 (Pltf. Ex. 1). 
The defendants testified that the value of their land 
was $1,500 per acre (Tr. 21). There was no evidence 
offered by the defendants regarding severance damage. 
The State's appraisal witness, Mr. John Bushnell, testi-
fied that the value of the land taken was $500 per acre 
or $3,340 for the 6.68 acres taken (Tr. 38, 39). Mr. Bush-
nell also testified that there would be severance damage 
to the remaining 1.18 acres north of the taking amounting 
to $531 (Tr. 39). Mr. Bushnell testified that there would 
be no severance damage to the defendants' property 
south of the taking. 
The Jury returned a verdict broken down as follows: 
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:i 
Market value of property 
taken by the State .. ($800 Per Acre) ..$5,344.00 
Damages, if any, by reason of severance 1,500.00 
TotalJudgment (H. ;.:) $6,844.00 
The amount of severance damage awarded by the 
Jury ($1,500) was $969.00 higher than the only evidence 
regarding severance damage offered at trial ($531). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT A MEW TRIAL OR IN THE AL-
TERNATIVE T r ALLOW THE DEFEN-
DANTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACCEPT 
REMITTITUR; THE MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
SINCE THE VERDICT REGARDING SEV-
ERANCE DAMAGE WAS EXCESSIVE AND 
DID NOT CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE. 
The jury in the instant case awarded the defendants 
$1,500 as severance damage. The only testimony offered 
during the trial regarding severance damage was that of 
the plaintiff's witness amounting to $531.00. 
It is a well established rule of law in this jurisdiction 
that for a verdict to stand it must be within the range 
of the evidence offered. In the case of State Road Com-
mission v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P. 2d 347 (1968), 
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the court found that even though the verdict regarding 
the value of the land taken was within the range of the 
testimony the award for severance damage was greater 
than any testimony at trial. The court held that the 
award for severance damage was excessive and was a 
basis for granting a new trial. 
The situation presented in the SiUiman case is pre-
cisely the one involved in the instant case. The verdict 
in the present case regarding the value of the land taken 
was within the range of the testimony offered, however, 
the amount of severance damage awarded was greater 
than any testimony offered during the trial. 
The Utah Court granted a new trial in the case of 
Porcupine Reservoir Company v. Lloyd W. Keller Cor-
poration, 15 Utah 2d 318, 392 P. 2d 620 (1964). In this 
case the jury award for severance damages was less than 
the evidence offered at trial. This insufficiency of the 
award was the basis for the court granting a new trial. 
This rule of law is followed in other jurisdictions. In 
the case of State Highway Commission v. Emery, 481 P. 
2d 686 (1971), the Montana Supreme Court ordered a 
new trial where, in a condemnation case, the jury verdict 
was outside the range of the testimony offered at trial. 
In the Emery case the total verdict was within the range 
of the testimony ($23,400), however, the portion of the 
verdict pertaining to the value of the land taken ($6,127) 
was in excess of the highest value testified to by any of 
the witnesses ($507). 
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In another Montana case the court stated: 
"It is a fundamental and vHi established 
rule of law that the burden of pi^ol as to the 
amount of damages in condemnation proceed-
ings is upon the property owner. Here by ex-
perts' testimony, the highest figure for the land 
and improvements taken was $9,856, and the 
trial court erred in denying a motion for new 
trial when the jury failed to find in this or a 
lesser amount" State Highway Commission v. 
Barnes, 443 P. 2d 16 (Mont. 1968). (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is the plaintiff's contention that, just as the court 
erred in the Barnes case by not granting a new trial, the 
court in the instant case erred in refusing to grant a new 
trial since the severance damage awarded by the jury 
was greater than the highest testimony of $531, 
In the Utah Case of Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P. 2d 730 (1958), the 
Utah Supreme Court found that where a jury awarded 
$1,850 for severance damages and there was no evidence 
to support that amount the award should be set aside. 
A California court held that a new trial should be 
granted where the jury verdict was outside the range of 
the testimony. In the case of People v. McCulhughy 223 
P. 2d 37 at 40 (Calif. 1950) the court stated: 
l<;
 it appears from the testimony of the 
witnesses both for defendant and plaintiff that 
the highest value placed on parcel 14 was $1,500 
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and the jury verdict was for $2,800. The highest 
value placed on parcel 31 was $1,326 and the 
jury verdict was $3,000. The verdict, therefore, 
in this respect, appeared to be without sufficient 
evidentiary support and would authorize the 
granting of a new trial on that ground." 
Plaintiff submits that in the instant case, the jury 
verdict for severance damages in the amount of $1,500 
is without evidentiary support and, therefore, should not 
be allowed to stand. I t is clear from the evidence offered 
and the verdict rendered that either the jury did not 
understand the law relating to the awarding of severance 
damages or their award was based on passion or prejudice, 
CONCLUSION 
The only testimony offered during the trial of the 
instant case regarding severance damage was that defen-
dants' small remainder to the north of the freeway con-
sisting of 1.18 acres had been damages in the amount of 
$531.00. The jury award of severance damage in the 
amount of $1,500 is not supported by the evidence and 
is excessive. 
Under the law heretofore cited when a verdict of 
damages is either in excess of the highest testimony al-
lowed in evidence or below the lowest the verdict cannot 
stand. Plaintiff submits that in the instant case the ver-
dictf or severance damage was in excess of the highest 
testimony allowed in evidence and, therefore, cannot 
stand. The plaintiff respectfully requests that this case 
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be remanded for a new trial or in the alternative that 
amount of the award in excess of the evidence be re-
mitted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DONALD S. COLEMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
